Abstract. Inspired by Strotz's consistent planning strategy, we formulate the infinite horizon mean-variance stopping problem as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in order to determine time consistent strategies with no regret. Equilibria among stopping times or randomized stopping times may not exist. This motivates us to consider the notion of liquidation strategies, which lets the stopping right to be divisible. We then argue that the mean-standard deviation variant of this problem makes more sense for this type of strategies in terms of time consistency. It turns out that an equilibrium liquidation strategy always exists. We then analyze whether optimal equilibrium liquidation strategies exist and whether they are unique and observe that neither may hold.
Introduction
Consider an optimal stopping problem with an infinite time horizon
where X is a Markov process starting from state x, and the stopping time τ is chosen to maximize the expectation of the payoff function g. A classical approach to solving this optimal stopping problem is to use dynamic programming. Thanks to the particular formula of (1.1), this problem is known to be time-consistent in the sense that its optimal stopping strategy does not depend on the initial state x. However, such property may fail to hold in some seemingly quite natural problems where the objective function is in different forms. In those cases, a stopping strategy that is optimal from "today's" point of view may not be optimal anymore from "tomorrow's" point of view. Optimal stopping, more generally, optimal control problems with such property are said to be time-inconsistent. Typical examples include non-exponential discounting, the optimization criteria used in cumulative prospect theory (e.g. rank based utility), and the mean-variance criteria, which is the focus of our paper.
There are three ways one could deal with time-inconsistency, dating back to the seminal work of Strotz [15] . The first is to formulate an optimal stopping problem with a given initial state x. The optimal stopping time τ x is then parametrized by the initial state x. Once the state starts at x, and optimal policy τ x is determined, the player is precommitted to implementing this strategy. This strategy simply does not take the change of future preferences into account. The second is to have the agent repeatedly solve this problem, hence allow for changes in future preferences. [15] called this strategy naive and further repercussions about this strategy are discussed in [5] . [13] discusses these two formulations under the labels static optimality and dynamic optimality.
The third way is to formulate the problem in game theoretic terms by viewing each state x as a player in a game regarding when to stop the process X and look for equilibrium strategies. Roughly speaking, an equilibrium strategy, which is also called a consistent plan, can be viewed as a noregret strategy since the agent has no incentive to deviate from the strategy at any current state x. The third way is the formulation we will follow here to analyze this problem in an infinite-horizon discrete-time setting. In discrete time, infinite horizon is much more challenging than finite horizon because [14] 's backward sequential optimization approach to obtain the consistent plans no longer works.
Recently, there has been a lot of effort in determining the equilibrium strategies in stochastic control problems, see e.g. [3] and the references therein. However, the treatment of stopping problems only dates back to [8] , which considers these problems in the context of hyperbolic discounting. This paper formulates equilibrium stopping policies as fixed points of an operator and construct a large class of equilibria by iterating this operator. This effort is continued in [9] when the agents use probability distortions to calculate their criteria. We should also mention the recent work of [4] which extends the consistent planning framework to consider non-exponential discounting and endogenous habit formation. The most relevant work to our problem is [11] . In [11] , the authors consider a discrete-time infinite horizon problem with non-exponential discounting. They obtain the existence of a pure stopping equilibrium, and show the existence and uniqueness of an optimal equilibrium. Also see [10] which is a continuous-time extension of [11] . Unfortunately the fixed point approach used in [11] does not work for our problem because of the non-linearity of the criteria. [4] also pointed out that the mean-variance problem is out of the scope of their approach.
We will indeed observe that, unlike the above papers, equilibrium stopping times in meanvariance problems may not exist. The main novelty in this paper is the determination of the right type of "mixed" equilibrium strategies and the appropriate modification of the criteria to make sense of the consistent planning problem. We will also show that the obvious choice of mixing, i.e., a randomized stopping strategies, does not work because when an eqilibrium in this class exists it coincides with the pure equilibrium strategy. (One should contrast this to the Example 2.6 of [4] .) The right notion of strategies turns out to be the liquidation strategies that were introduced by [1] (see also [2] ) in the context of subhedging American options. The stopping right is taken to be divisible, or rather as a finite resource/fuel that the agent can consume continuously. The differences between randomized and liquidation strategies are highlighted in Remark 2.1. We will see that in this case equilibrium strategies always exist.
Instead of the mean-variance benchmark, we propose using the mean-standard deviation criteria. We think it is more meaningful in the context of consistent planning. One reason is that the mean and standard deviation are associated with the same unit. Moreover, the scaling property of this new objective function plays along well with liquidation strategies -no matter what the history liquidation strategy is, we will face the same problem as soon as we are in the same state, because we can factor out the proportion of the stopping right remaining in the objective function.
As in [11] , we are interested in determining the optimal equilibrium. Although Pareto equilibrium always exists, we will demonstrate through several examples that optimal equilibrium may or may not exist. When it exists it may not even be unique. For comparison, we also define equilibrium liquidation strategies for the mean-variance problem in a similar way. The consequent results reinforce our concerns about its properness in terms of consistent planning.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the mean-standard deviation problem. We first analyze the equilibrium stopping time, and provide an example to show such equilibrium may not exist. Then we introduce the concepts of randomized stopping times and liquidation strategies and analyze the equilibria in these classes. In Section 3 we consider the similar concepts for mean-variance problems. In Section 4 we compare equilibrium liquidation strategies with statically optimal ones. Some computational details can be found in Appendix A.
Mean-Standard Deviation Problem
Consider a probability space (Ω, F, P) that supports a time-homogeneous discrete-time Markov chain X = (X n ) n∈N , taking values in a finite state space X. For each x ∈ X, if X 0 = x, we will write X as X x . The probability, expectation, and variation associated with X x will be denoted by
and Var x [·], respectively. We assume that the limit X ∞ := lim n→∞ X n exists almost surely.
2.1. Equilibrium Stopping Times. For any x ∈ X and τ ∈ T , consider the following objective function in mean-standard deviation problem
where c > 0 is a constant and the subscript "p" in K p (x, τ ) stands for "pure Markov stopping time".
As we have discussed in the introduction part, this mean-standard deviation problem is timeinconsistent due to the non-linear term (Var x [X τ ]) 1/2 . We treat it as an intra-personal game regarding when to stop the process X between current and future selves whose preferences, identified with the objective function K p , change as the initial state x changes. A reasonable equilibrium strategy should be such that once the agent chooses to follow the equilibrium strategy he will never regret no matter which state he comes into. Furthermore, we only consider the pure Markov stopping times commonly used in game theory; see e.g. [4] and [12] . Definition 2.1. A stopping time τ is said to be a pure Markov stopping time, or pure stopping time for short, if τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : X t ∈ S} for some measurable set S ⊂ X and S is called the stopping region.
A pure stopping time governs when the agent should stop. The decision whether to stop or not depends directly on the current state x and not on the past path of process X. A corresponding subgame perfect Nash equilibrium based on pure Markov stopping time is defined as the following. Definition 2.2. A pure Markov stopping time τ with stopping region S is said to be an equilibrium stopping time for (2.1) if
where ρ(x, S) := inf{n ≥ 1 : X x n ∈ S} ∈ T .
The next result shows that an equilibrium stopping time may not exist.
Proposition 2.1. An equilibrium stopping time does not always exist.
Proof. We will prove this by giving a counterexample. Let c = 1. X has state space X = {0, 1, 3, 6, 10} and the following transition matrix. Case 1: S = {0, 1, 3, 6, 10}. We have that P 1 (X ρ(1,S) = 0) = P 1 (X ρ(1,S) = 6) = P 1 (X ρ(1,S) = 10) = 0.2, P 1 (X ρ(1,S) = 3) = 0. 4 , then ρ(1, S) ) = 1.0177 > 1, which yields a contradiction.
Case 2: S = {0, 3, 6, 10}. We have that P 6 (X ρ(6,S) = 0) = P 6 (X ρ(6,S) = 6) = 0.04, P 6 (X ρ(6,S) = 3) = 0.8, P 6 (X ρ(6,S) = 10) = 0.84, then
ρ(6,S) ] = 86.16 ⇒ K p (6, ρ(6, S)) = 6.1771 > 6, which yields a contradiction.
Case 3: S = {0, 1, 3, 10}. We have that P 6 (X ρ(6,S) = 1) = 0.2, P 6 (X ρ(6,S) = 10) = 0.8, then
which yields a contradiction.
Case 4: S = {0, 3, 10}. We have that
Randomized Stopping Times.
In the last section, we observed that there is no guarantee that an equilibrium stopping time exists. Then we consider randomized stopping times. Intuitively, when using a randomized stopping time, we flip a coin at each period to decide whether we stop or not.
Let us first briefly recall some facts of randomized stopping times, and we refer to [6] for more details. A randomized stopping time (w.r.t. the original space (Ω, F)) is a stopping time w.r.t. the extended space (
where Leb is the Lebesgue measure. Intuitively, M k (ω) represents the probability that the underlying process has stopped by time k along the path ω. Moreover, there is a one-to-one correspondence (up to a rearrangement) between γ and M ; see [6] . For the Markov chain X and any randomized stopping time γ with the ω-distribution M , denote
Definition 2.3. We say γ is a time-homogeneous randomized stopping time, if there exists p :
Here p(x) represents the probability to stop at state x, given the underlying process has not stopped yet. We call p : X → [0, 1] a randomized stopping strategy, and denote the set of all of them by P.
For any p, q ∈ P, denote γ q⊗p as the randomized stopping time with the ω-distribution In Definition 2.2, an equilibrium stopping time is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which all players use pure Markov stopping times. Now we propose to consider an equilibrium randomized stopping strategy which is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the game where all players use time-homogeneous randomized stopping times and their preferences are identified with the following objective function
where p is a randomized stopping strategy and the subscript "r" in K r stands for "randomize stopping strategy".
Definition 2.4. p ∈ P is said to be an equilibrium randomized stopping strategy for (2.3), if for any mapping q :
where K r (x, q ⊗ p) is from (2.3) by replacing p with p ⊗ q.
If p ∈ P with p(x) = 0 or 1 for any x ∈ X, then it simply gives us a pure stopping time with stopping region {x ∈ X : p(x) = 1}. We have the following result, which together with Proposition 2.1 implies that an equilibrium randomized stopping strategy does not always exist. Proposition 2.2. If p ∈ P is an equilibrium randomized stopping strategy for (2.3), then p(x) = 0 or 1 for any (transient state) x ∈ X. Conversely, if there is an equilibrium stopping time with stopping region S, then p ∈ P defined by
is an equilibrium randomized stopping strategy.
For the proof of this proposition we will need the following result:
Lemma 2.1. Let γ 1 , γ 2 be two randomized stopping times and λ ∈ (0, 1).
is also a randomized stopping time and Proof. We have that
The rest of the result is easy to check.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Let p ∈ P be an equilibrium randomized stopping strategy for (2.3).
Suppose there exists a transient state x ∈ X such that 0 < λ := p(x) < 1. Denote
where 1 ∈ P (resp. 0 ∈ P) is the strategy with all components 1 (resp. 0). We have the following.
where (2.7) follows from Lemma 2.1 and (2.8) follows from (2.4). This implies that equality holds for (2.7). By Lemma 2.1
However, this is not possible as x is a transient state.
Conversely, assume there is an equilibrium stopping time with stopping region S, and define p ∈ P as in (2.5). Let q ∈ P and x ∈ X. Denote λ := q(x), and define α and β as in (2.6). We consider two cases:
Then by a similar argument as above, we have that
Equilibrium Liquidation Strategies.
Definition 2.5. An adapted nondecreasing process θ = (θ n ) n∈N is said to be a liquidation strategy, if θ 0 ≥ 0, and lim
A liquidation strategy θ is said to be time homogeneous, if there exists η :
Denote by L the collection of all time-homogeneous liquidation strategies.
Consider the objective function
where the subscript "l" in K l (x, θ) stands for "liquidation strategy" and θ(X) is the payoff under liquidation strategy θ
If θ = θ η ∈ L is a time-homogeneous liquidation strategy, then
(2.10)
First we use an example to illustrate the motivation to consider liquidation strategies. If X is divisible, then it is possible that the optimal value for pure stopping time sup τ K p (x, τ ) is strictly less than K l (x, θ) for some liquidation strategy θ and some x ∈ X. Then it is easy to see that the optimal stopping value for K p (x, τ ) is given by
where τ := inf{n ≥ 0 : X n = 0, 2, 3}, and τ := inf{n ≥ 0 : X n = 0, 3}. Now consider the liquidation strategy θ given by θ 0 (·) = 0, θ 1 (·, 2) = 1/2, and θ n = 0 for all other cases.
Then it is easy to see that
Then the distribution of θ(X 1 ) is given by
Therefore, we have that
Remark 2.1. As discussed in Remark 3.1 in Bayraktar and Zhou's paper [1] , there is a oneto-one correspondence between the set of time-homogeneous liquidation strategies L and the set of time-homogeneous randomized stopping times P. But the paths of a liquidation strategy and a randomized stopping time are quite different. First of all, in terms of behavior, when using a randomized stopping time, we flip a coin at each period to decide whether we stop or not, and we still liquidate the whole unit asset over a single period. Second, in terms of variance, randomized stopping time will result in a larger variance, since the overall variance will include the part from randomization of the stopping time, while liquidation strategy results in a smaller variance, since averaging random variable leads to a smaller variance. This can also be seen from Lemma 2.1 and the following result.
Lemma 2.2. Let θ 1 , θ 2 be two liquidation strategies and λ ∈ (0, 1). Then λθ 1 + (1 − λ)θ 2 is also a liquidation strategy and
Proof. We have that
The second inequality is easy to check.
Our next goal is to analyze the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the game where all players use time-homogeneous liquidation strategies. Notice that each time-homogeneous liquidation strategy is characterized by a function η(x) that represents the proportion of the remaining asset we will liquidate when the Markov chain moves to position x. η(x) is independent of time and the history of the paths. For simplicity of notation, we use
Definition 2.6. A liquidation strategy θ = θ η ∈ L is said to be an equilibrium liquidation strategy for (2.9) if for any mapping ξ : X → [0, 1], we have
where θ ξ⊗η is a perturbation of strategy θ η in which we liquidate ξ(·) at time 0 and then from time 1 we liquidate η(·) proportion of the remaining asset at each period.
Remark 2.2. Notice that this definition looks similar to the definition of equilibrium randomized stopping time. But as we mentioned earlier, unlike selling the whole unit of asset in one period which is random, the liquidation strategy will leave us with different proportions of asset at different periods, so the objective function might change as time goes on. Thanks to the square root term in (2.9), mean-standard deviation problem has the scaling effect which allows Definition 2.6 to make perfect sense since we essentially face the same problem (with the same parameter c) at every period. However, we will see in Section 3, a similar definition of equilibrium liquidation strategy in mean-variation problem is not a proper definition.
2.4.
Existence of an Equilibrium Liquidation Strategy. In this section we will prove that in contrast to the equilibrium stopping time for (2.1) and equilibrium randomized stopping time for (2.3), an equilibrium liquidation strategy for (2.9) always exists.
Then along ω, we have that
Proof. As
it suffices to show that
We have that
where α := sup{|y| : y ∈ X}. Hence, we have (2.11) holds.
Noticing that
we have that
and thus (2.12) follows.
Moreover,
where the last line follows from Lemma 2.3, and thus (2.13) holds.
Finally,
which implies (2.14).
Theorem 2.2. There exists an equilibrium liquidation strategy for the mean-standard deviation problem (2.9).
Proof. For η ∈ L, define the set valued map
First, we have that for any η ∈ L, Φ(η) is not empty. Indeed, since K l (x, ξ ⊗ η) depends on ξ only through ξ(x), we can choose ξ * (x) to be a maximizer for each x fixed.
For ξ 1 , ξ 2 , η ∈ L and λ ∈ (0, 1), we have that θ η⊗η = θ η and
Moreover, thanks to Lemma 2.2, we obtain that Φ(η) is a convex set for any η ∈ L. In addition, by Lemma 2.4, the map Φ is u.s.c.. That is, for η n , ξ * n , η, ξ * ∈ L with η n → η and ξ * n → ξ * , if ξ * n ∈ Φ(η n ), then ξ * ∈ Φ(η).
Applying the fixed point theorem in [7] , we obtain the desired result.
Remark 2.3. As we can see in this proof, the assumption that X have finite state space and the limit X ∞ exists a.s. is necessary to obtain some key estimations which are hard to achieve when the state space is infinite. Despite this, the concepts introduced in this paper do not rely on this assumption and a future work can focus on extending certain results to the case with infinite state space.
2.5.
Optimal Equilibrium Liquidation Strategies. According to consistent planning in Strotz, finding equilibria is only the first step and the agent should choose the best one among all equilibria. We then formulate the definition of optimal equilibrium liquidation strategy as the following.
Definition 2.7. Let E ⊂ L be the collection of equilibrium liquidation strategies. We say an equilibrium liquidation strategy η * ∈ E is optimal if
To find an optimal equilibrium liquidation strategy, we need to study the set E. We will provide a characterization of equilibrium liquidation strategies in the following proposition. Proposition 2.3. η is an equilibrium liquidation strategy if and only if the following holds:
is interpreted as the continuation value. Then (i) and (ii) tell us whether we should liquidate the whole unit or not liquidate at all by comparing the current value x and the continuation value. This is in fact in the same vein as (2.2).
Proof of Proposition 2.3. By (2.10), we have 15) which implies that when η is fixed,
If η is an equilibrium liquidation strategy, then according to Definition 2.6,
Corollary 2.1. If there exists an equilibrium stopping time τ with stopping region S, then η(x) = 1 S (x), x ∈ X is an equilibrium liquidation strategy.
By Proposition
The solution {η(x) ∈ [0, 1] : x ∈ X} must be an equilibrium liquidation strategy if it exists. Other candidates of equilibrium liquidation strategies can be found by checking conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2.3 when
does not hold for some x ∈ X. Here are some examples of mean-standard deviation problems with different sets of equilibrium liquidation strategies E. Example 2.3. In this example, a unique equilibrium liquidation strategy exists, which is also an equilibrium stopping time.
Let c = 1/4. X has state space X = {0, 1, 2} and the following transition matrix. Note that {0, 2} are absorbing states. For any pure stopping time, its stopping region must contain the absorbing states {0, 2}. Likewise, any liquidation strategy must satisfy η(0) = η(2) = 1.
One can easily check that the pure stopping time with stopping region S = {0, 2} is an equilibrium stopping time with
Moreover, this is the only equilibrium stopping time. If S = {0, 1, 2}, then
which means the pure stopping time with stopping region {0, 1, 2} is not an equilibrium stopping time.
Now we want to find all equilibrium liquidation strategies for this problem. The only parameter remains to be determined is a := η(1).
By analyzing the behavior of this Markov chain we have
and
(1 − η(1)) i ),
In conclusion, the random variable Y η has the following distribution
It can be derived that
. By computation we have h(a) > 1 for all a ∈ [0, 1]. So there is only one equilibrium liquidation strategy, η(1) = 0, which also coincides with the unique equilibrium stopping time mentioned above. Example 2.4. In this example, a unique equilibrium liquidation strategy exists, which is not a pure stopping time.
Consider the example in the proof of Proposition 2.1. Since {0, 3, 10} are absorbing states, we have η(0) = η(3) = η(10) = 1. The only parameters remain to be determined are a := η(1) and b := η(6). By the proof of Proposition 2.1. we know that there is no equilibrium stopping time in this example. However we will see that it does have an equilibrium liquidation strategy. From Figure 1 we observe that there exists a unique intersection of the curve g 1 (a, b) = 1 and g 6 (a, b) = 6, denoted by (a 0 , b 0 ). Then η(1) = a 0 , η(6) = b 0 is an equilibrium liquidation strategy which is not a pure stopping time. There could be other equilibrium liquidation strategies in the following cases.
(i) If g 1 (a, 0) = 1 and g 6 (a, 0) > 6, then η(1) = a, η(6) = 0 is an equilibrium liquidation strategy;
(ii) If g 1 (a, 1) = 1 and g 6 (a, 1) < 6, then η(1) = a, η(6) = 1 is an equilibrium liquidation strategy; However, from the above graph, we conclude that there are no solutions for g 1 (a, 0) = 1, g 1 (a, 1) = 1, g 6 (0, b) = 6 or g 6 (1, b) = 6. So there is only one equilibrium liquidation strategy in this example.
The above two examples illustrate that an equilibrium liquidation strategy exists regardless of the existence of equilibrium stopping times. Since the equilibrium liquidation strategies are unique in Example 2.3 and Example 2.4, they are also optimal. However, uniqueness of an equilibrium liquidation strategy and existence of an optimal equilibrium liquidation strategy are not guaranteed in general as we will show later.
From Proposition 2.3 and (2.15), we have that
K l (x, η) = max{x, E x [Y η ] − cVar x [Y η ]} = x, 0 < η(x) ≤ 1, E x [Y η ] − cVar x [Y η ], 0 ≤ η(x) < 1.
(2.16)
A necessary condition for η * ∈ E to be an optimal equilibrium liquidation strategy is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4. If an equilibrium liquidation strategy η * ∈ E is optimal then
where C(η) := {x ∈ X :
Proof. Suppose C(η * ) = η∈E C(η) does not hold. Then there exists some η ∈ E and some x ∈ X such that x ∈ C(η) and x / ∈ C(η * ). Then by (2.16) we have that
which contradicts that η * is optimal.
Corollary 2.2. If η∈E C(η) = ∅, then any η ∈ E is an optimal equilibrium liquidation strategy.
Proof. If η∈E C(η) = ∅, then for all η ∈ E and all x ∈ X, we have K l (x, η) = x. By definition, they are all optimal.
The next proposition shows that the existence and uniqueness of an optimal equilibrium liquidation strategy are not guaranteed. 
. By analysis shown in Appendix A.2, we obtain the following results.
(2) There exists a unique b 0 ∈ (0, 1) such that g 7 (0, b 0 ) = 7. (ii) We will give an example in which there exist multiple equilibrium liquidation strategies but none of them are optimal.
Let c = 0.1. X has state space X = {0, 11, 17, 18} and the following transition matrix. 
. By analysis shown in Appendix A.3, we obtain the following results.
(1) There is not intersection of the curve g 11 (a, b) = 11 and g 17 (a, b) = 17.
(2) There exist 0 < a 1 < a 2 < a 3 < a 4 < 1 and 0 < b 0 < 1 such that g 17 (a 1 , 0) = 17, g 17 (a 2 , 1) = 17, g 17 (a 4 , 1) = 17, g 11 (a 3 , 0) = g 11 (a 3 , 1) = 11, and g 17 (1, b 0 ) = 17.
(3) g 11 (a 1 , 0) = 11, g 11 (a 2 , 1) = 11 and g 11 (a 4 , 1) = 11.
(4) g 17 (a 3 , 0) > 17, g 17 (a 3 , 1) > 17 and g 11 (1, b 0 ) < 11.
So there are five equilibrium liquidation strategies in total. The following table summarises the values of objective functions under these equilibrium liquidation strategies. The table shows that there is no optimal equilibrium liquidation strategy.
(iii) We will give an example in which there are two equilibrium liquidation strategies and both are optimal.
Let c = 0.5. X has state space X = {0, 1, 4} and the following transition matrix. Since the existence of optimal equilibrium liquidation strategy is not guaranteed, we naturally turn to the concept of Pareto optimality. Definition 2.8. η * ∈ E is called a Pareto optimal equilibrium liquidation strategy if there is no η ∈ E such that
Remark 2.5. In the second example in proof of Proposition 2.5, the optimal equilibrium liquidation strategy does not exist, but (0, 1) and (a 3 , 0) are both Pareto optimal equilibrium liquidation strategies. Proposition 2.6. A Pareto optimal equilibrium liquidation strategy always exists.
Proof. Consider the following optimization problem
Then any maximizer η * of this problem is a Pareto optimal equilibrium liquidation strategy. Otherwise, there exists η ∈ E such that
, which contradicts that η * is the maximizer of the problem.
Next we will show such maximizer exists and is in E. Let η n be the 1 n -optimizer of (2.17). Then there exists η * ∈ L such that η n → η * . Since {η n } n∈N are all equilibrium liquidation strategies, K l (x, ξ ⊗ η n ) ≤ K l (x, η n ) holds for all x ∈ X and all ξ ∈ L. By the continuity of the mappings
also holds for all x ∈ X and all ξ ∈ L, i.e., η * is also an equilibrium liquidation strategy. Again by the continuity of mapping η → K l (x, η), η * is the maximizer of (2.17).
Mean-Variace Problem
As what we have done in mean-standard deviation problem, we will analyze different types of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in mean-variance problems. More specifically, we define equilibrium stopping time, equilibrium randomized stopping strategy and equilibrium liquidation strategy for mean-variance problems as the following. Definition 3.1. A pure Markov stopping time τ with stopping region S is said to be an equilibrium stopping time for mean-variance problem if
where ρ(x, S) := inf{n ≥ 1 :
A randomized stopping time p ∈ P is said to be an equilibrium randomized stopping time for mean-variance problem, if for any mapping q : 
Remark 3.1. Definition 3.3 seems to be reasonable as an analogy of Definition 2.6. However, since there is no scaling effect in mean-variance problem, this definition has deviated from the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. For example, at time t = 0, the objective function is
If we liquidate 1 − α proportion of the asset, then the objective function at time t = 1 would become
i.e., the preference of player "
Generally, the proportion of asset remaining, α, is decreasing as time goes on, therefore we are faced with different problems with different parameter c at different time, even if the initial state remains the same. Definitions of equilibrium liquidation strategies in Definition 3.3 and Definition 2.6 only make sense when the objective function remains the same for the same initial state x. Proposition 3.1. An equilibrium stopping time for mean-variance problem may not exist.
Proof. We will prove this by giving a counterexample. Let c = Suppose there exists an equilibrium stopping time with stopping region S ⊂ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Denote H(·, S) = J p (·, ρ(·, S)). We consider the following four cases.
Case 1: 1, 2 ∈ S. We have
, and
, and thus H(1, S) = 76 75 > 1, that yields a contradiction.
Case 2: 1 / ∈ S and 2 ∈ S. We have 19 3 , and thus H(2, S) = 147 75
that yields a contradiction.
Case 4: 1, 2 / ∈ S. We have that
, and thus H(1, S) = 633 640 < 1, that yields a contradiction.
Besides, using a proof similar to the case of mean-standard deviation problem, we can show that an equilibrium randomized stopping time for mean-variance problem exists if and only if it is an equilibrium stopping time. Now we will focus on the equilibrium liquidation strategy for mean-variance problem as defined in Definition 3.3, although it is not a proper definition as pointed out in Remark 3.1. Following an argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 2.2, we can prove that there exists an equilibrium liquidation strategy in mean-variance problem. The next proposition shows that in contrast to mean-standard deviation problem, the equilibrium liquidation strategy is not a generalization of equilibrium stopping time in mean-variance problem. 
It is easy to check that max ξ J l (1, ξ ⊗ η) = instead of 0. By definition η is not an equilibrium liquidation strategy.
This result reinforces that the equilibrium liquidation strategy for mean-variance problem is not a proper definition.
Comparison with Static Optimal Stopping Time
In this section, we want to compare the pre-committment strategy with the equilibrium liquidation strategy. It is obvious that given any current state x, the static optimality is no less than the value of K p (x, τ ) where τ is an equilibrium stopping time. However this may not be the case when we compare static optimal stopping times with equilibrium liquidation strategies. As we have discussed in Example 2.1, a liquidation strategy may produce larger value than the static optimal stopping time does. However in Example 2.1, the liquidation strategy is not an equilibrium. The following examples show that an equilibrium liquidation strategy may produce larger value than the static optimal stopping time does in both mean-standard deviation problem and mean-variance problem. For mean-standard deviation problem,
where τ = inf{n ≥ 0 : X 1 n ∈ {0, 2, 9}}. The optimal equilibrium liquidation strategy η is the same as τ . We have
For mean-variance problem,
where τ = 0.
The unique equilibrium liquidation strategy is η(1) = a ∈ (0, 1), η(7) = b ∈ (0, 1) where a ≈ 0.6778 and b ≈ 0.9089. Details on finding the equilibrium liquidation strategy can be found in Appendix A.5. We have For mean-standard deviation problem,
where τ = inf{n ≥ 0 : X 1 n ∈ {0, 18}}, τ = inf{n ≥ 0 : X 1 n ∈ {0, 17, 18}}, and sup
where τ = inf{n ≥ 0 : X 1 n ∈ {0, 11, 18}}. There is an equilibrium liquidation strategy η(11) = a 3 ∈ (0, 1), η(17) = 0. We have
The unique equilibrium liquidation strategy is η(11) = a ∈ (0, 1), η(17) = b ∈ (0, 1) where a ≈ 0.9312 and b ≈ 0.7629. Details on finding the equilibrium liquidation strategy can be found in Appendix A.5. We have 
From the above, we can conclude that (1) When X 0 = 1,
where t = (1 − a)(1 − b), and
η ] = c 2 + −1.92c 2 + 9.6c − 1.28cb 1 − 0.04t + 0.96c 2 − 9.6c + 39.6 − 12.8b + 1.28bc + 2.56b 2 1 − 0.04t 2 .
(2) When X 0 = 6,
where t = (1 − a)(1 − b), and Then we will obtain the result in Example 2.4.
A.2. The first example in Proposition 2.5. Since the transition matrix in this example is the same as Example 2.4, by following a similar analysis of X's trajectories, we have (1) When X 0 = 1,
where c = a+7b−ab 1−(1−a)(1−b) and t = (1 − a)(1 − b). Then we have
(2) When X 0 = 7,
Furthermore, we can find that for any a, b 
Also notice that (a, b) = (0, 0) is not a equilibrium liquidation strategy since g 17 (0, 0) = 16.9934 < 17.
To find all equilibrium liquidation strategies, we need to analyze all the possible trajectories of this Markov chain when starting from 11 and 17. Then Y η = 18 with probability 0.2 and Y η = 11a . From the graph, we can observe that there exist 0 < a 1 < a 2 < a 3 < a 4 < 1 and 0 < b 0 < 1 such that g 17 (a 1 , 0) = 17, g 17 (a 2 , 1) = 17, g 17 (a 4 , 1) = 17; g 11 (a 3 , 0) = g 11 (a 3 , 1) = 11; g 17 (1, b 0 ) = 17.
Also from the graph we know that g 11 (a 1 , 0) = 11, g 11 (a 2 , 1) = 11 and g 11 (a 4 , 1) = 11, so they cannot be equilibrium liquidation strategies. To find out whether (a 3 , 0), (a 3 , 1) and (1, b 0 ) are equilibrium liquidation strategies. We plot the graphs of g 11 (a, b 0 ), g 17 (a, 0) and g 17 (a, 1) as functions of a ∈ [0, 1].
These graphs show that g 11 (1, b 0 ) < 11, g 17 (a 3 , 0) > 17, and g 17 (a 3 , 1) > 17. So there are five equilibrium liquidation strategies as discussed in part (ii) of the proof of Proposition 2.5. 
